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detriment of the estate, such a directorate insulates the liability of the fiduciary. Thus promoters, although standing in a fiduciary relationship, may deal with their corporation to their own advantage if they furnish it with an independent directorate and make full disclosure of their own interests. See *Dickerman v. Northern Trust Co.*, 176 U. S. 181, 204; *Erlanger v. New Sombrero Phosphate Co.*, 3 App. Cas. 1218, 1236. But, even assuming such a directorate, a decision *contra* to the principal case would not be surprising, and would not require any "disregard of the corporate fiction."

EXTRADITION — INTERSTATE RENDITION — LIABILITY OF THE SURRENDERED PERSON TO CIVIL ACTION IN THE DEMANDING STATE. — The defendant was brought into Oregon from Utah by virtue of rendition proceedings, to be tried for a crime. While the prosecution was pending he was personally summoned to answer in a civil action brought in an Oregon state court. Upon his petition the cause was removed to the Federal court. He then moved therein to quash the service of summons. *Held*, that the motion be granted. *Bramwell v. Owen*, 276 Fed. 36 (9th Circ.).

A non-resident voluntarily coming into the state to defend a civil action is exempt from the service of civil process in another action. See *BROWN, COURTS AND THEIR JURISDICTION*, 2 ed., § 42. The rule is based on a public policy to encourage voluntary attendance upon the courts and expedite the administration of justice. Since the reasons for the rule do not exist in the case of a defendant within the jurisdiction under compulsion, exemption from civil process is generally denied him. *Netgraph Mfg. Co. v. Scrugham*, 197 N. Y. 377, 90 N. E. 962. On the same ground the exemption is denied by the weight of authority to a defendant involuntarily present in the state by virtue of interstate rendition. *Reid v. Ham*, 54 Minn. 305, 56 N. W. 35; *Rutledge v. Krauss*, 73 N. J. L. 397, 63 Atl. 988. *Contra*, *Moletor v. Sinnen*, 76 Wis. 308, 44 N. W. 1099. But it is submitted that in this situation good faith on the part of the state requires the exemption. There is no objection to trying the defendant for a crime other than that for which he was surrendered; since if he returns to the surrendering state he can be again extradited. *Lascelles v. Georgia*, 148 U. S. 537. But the Constitution imposes an obligation on the states to surrender fugitives for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction only. See UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, Art. IV, § 2 (2). As to granting civil jurisdiction, the surrendering state stands on the same footing as an independent sovereignty. The rule of international extradition should apply. See *In re Reinitz*, 39 Fed. 204 (2d Circ.); *Smith v. Corrigan*, 249 Fed. 273 (5th Circ.). Unless the surrendering state expressly confers civil jurisdiction over the fugitive upon the demanding state it is a breach of good faith for the latter to assert it. See 17 HARV. L. REV. 498.

INTERNATIONAL LAW — *DE FACTO* GOVERNMENTS — RUSSIAN SOVIET AS PARTY DEFENDANT. — The plaintiff brought an action for conversion against the Soviet Government, jurisdiction being based on an attachment of its property. The Soviet Government had not been recognized by the United States. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that it had no capacity to be sued. *Held*, that the motion be denied. *Wulsohn v. Russian Soviet Government*, 66 N. Y. L. J. 1711 (Sup. Ct.).

One sovereign state may sue in another state. *United States v. Wagner*, L. R. 2 Ch. App. 582; *Republic of Honduras v. Soto*, 112 N. Y. 310, 19 N. E. 845; *State of Yucatan v. Argumedo*, 92 Misc. 547, 157 N. Y. Supp. 219. But the capacity to be a plaintiff has been denied to an unrecognized government. *Russian Soviet Government v. Cibrario*, 191 N. Y. Supp. 543 (App. Div.); *Russian Soviet Government v. Steamers Penza and Tobolsk*, 66 N. Y. L. J. 33 (Fed. Dist. Ct., E. D. N. Y.). But see 31 YALE L. J. 534. This case holds such